The Scheffler Shuffle
Date: November 28, 2025
While reviewing additional civil actions involving Ramsey County, Plaintiff identified a third, unrelated pro se case that reflects a familiar pattern of delay, selective procedural engagement, and shifting obligations. In Scheffler v. Ramsey County, Case No. 62-CV-25-6308 (Ramsey County District Court), Plaintiff Troy Kenneth Scheffler brings a Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) action concerning years of non-response to a September 7, 2021 data request relating to violence at the Minnesota State Fair, crime reporting practices, and related policies. Scheffler alleges that the County ignored statutory deadlines, refused to release public data, and caused him emotional distress.
Scheffler's case is not a civil-rights matter, and he does not raise concerns about ROA manipulation or docket irregularities. Instead, his filings describe a different pattern: a County that treats statutory obligations as optional when responding to an unrepresented litigant. Scheffler recounts Defendants serving a "procedurally impossible" motion before his case appeared on the docket, filing multiple versions of the same motion on different dates, and initiating a meet-and-confer only after being challenged. What matters for Plaintiff's analysis is that Ramsey County's response to Scheffler mirrors its response to Plaintiff: shifting timelines, selective enforcement of rules, and procedural posture used as a shield rather than a standard.
Summary in Context
Unlike Wright's case, Scheffler's filings do not reveal a second, conflicting internal ROA. His Register of Actions for 62-CV-25-6308 is a standard public MCRO export showing a stable, chronological sequence. Scheffler does not allege missing entries, altered timestamps, or inconsistent docket versions.
What his case does show is that when a pro se litigant presses for accountability under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Ramsey County engages in patterns that are familiar from Plaintiff's own proceedings: delayed compliance, inconsistent procedural posture, and litigation tactics that complicate rather than clarify the issues. Scheffler documents:
- Years-long delays in responding to a simple public-data request;
- Multiple missed statutory deadlines;
- A motion served before the case was docketed;
- Different versions of the same motion served on different dates;
- A belated, reactive meet-and-confer initiated only after he objected.
Where Scheffler's case becomes especially instructive is in how the court responded. The Scheduling Order issued on November 17, 2025 demonstrates that Judge Nelson took the matter seriously enough to impose structured deadlines for discovery, dispositive motions, and trial preparation. This contrasts sharply with the County's earlier informal approach and shows that once the litigation reached a judge's direct supervision, procedural rigor returned.
Scheffler's case highlights not a dual-record problem, but a dual-standard problem: a County that resists compliance until judicial oversight becomes unavoidable, and a pattern of procedural drift that stabilizes only when the court demands structure.
What Scheffler's Case Shows About Ramsey County
In Scheffler v. Ramsey County, the County filed multiple versions of the same motion in close succession (08/04, 08/11, 09/03, 09/08), each requiring Scheffler to re-orient himself to shifting deadlines and altered procedural posture. These repeated filings created overlapping timelines and contributed to the confusion Scheffler describes in his memoranda.
Scheffler documents:
- Long periods of non-response to statutory data-practices requests;
- Conflicting Notices of Motion for the same relief;
- Inconsistent communication from County Counsel about obligations and deadlines;
- A reactive rather than proactive approach to compliance;
- A County that treats procedure as flexible until a judge intervenes.
The turning point in Scheffler's case is the November 17, 2025 Scheduling Order issued by Judge Nelson. Once the matter came under direct judicial management, the court imposed a clear discovery plan, deadlines, and expectations for both parties. The contrast between the County's informal, shifting conduct before judicial oversight and the structured posture after confirms that the procedural instability was not inherent to the case-it emerged from how the County chose to engage with a pro se litigant.
Brett Bacon and the "Official" Record
Unlike the Wright matter and Plaintiff's own proceedings, Scheffler's docket does not present competing ROA versions. The MCRO index for 62-CV-25-6308 is clean, sequential, and internally consistent. The issue in Scheffler's case is not the ROA itself, but how County Counsel Brett Bacon interprets and operationalizes procedure around it.
Across multiple filings, Bacon treated the County's shifting procedural posture as if each new version constituted the controlling record-even when the County had just served a different iteration of the same motion, adjusted deadlines, or changed the requested relief. Scheffler noted repeatedly that these midstream changes left him unable to determine which deadlines applied, what motion governed the next hearing, or how he was expected to respond.
The effect mirrors what Plaintiff experienced in her own proceedings: the County's written representations-not the MCRO ROA-created instability in the schedule, uncertainty about expected actions, and ambiguity regarding which filings were operative at any given moment.
By treating each new County filing or interpretation as the operative "official" reference point, while disregarding the confusion created by repeated, overlapping motions, Bacon converts procedural fluidity into a litigation advantage. Scheffler's ROA remains orderly, but the use of that record follows the same recurrent pattern seen across all three cases: timelines that shift as the County shifts them, obligations that change without clear notice, and a procedural landscape that becomes navigable only after direct judicial oversight is imposed.
Monell Implications
When Scheffler's case is viewed alongside the Wright filings and Plaintiff's own record, a broader, cross-case pattern becomes visible. Three independent litigants, in three unrelated procedural settings, documented the same structural behavior from the same governmental actors. Under Monell, such consistency supports the existence of a municipal custom or systemic administrative practice.
Although Scheffler's ROA itself remains intact, the procedural conduct of the County in his case mirrors the systemic issues documented elsewhere. Across all three matters, the following features recur:
- County-controlled timelines that shift in response to litigation pressure;
- Multiple, sometimes conflicting filings seeking the same relief, generating overlapping tasks;
- Deadlines or expectations that move midstream without clear explanation;
- Reliance by County Counsel on whichever procedural framing most benefits the County's position;
- Practical confusion that impairs a pro se litigant's ability to track hearings, respond to filings, or determine operative deadlines.
In Scheffler's case, these issues arose in a straightforward MGDPA dispute regarding delayed access to public data. The matter contains none of the ADA, retaliation, or evidentiary complexities present in Plaintiff's case-yet the same procedural drift appears. This indicates that the instability is not a function of the type of claim being asserted, but of the County's ordinary administrative practice when interacting with unrepresented litigants.
When three unrelated cases-civil rights, criminal-context records analysis, and a public-data enforcement lawsuit-all exhibit procedural instability generated by the same government actors, the inference is plain: Ramsey County's case-processing framework operates with a consistent pattern of shifting timelines, inconsistent obligations, and reactive compliance. Under Monell, such a persistent administrative structure is attributable to the County itself.
What This Means Going Forward
For Strickland v. Ramsey County, et al., Scheffler's filings demonstrate that the County's procedural instability is not confined to a single litigant, a particular case type, or any one judicial officer. Although Scheffler's MCRO ROA is orderly, the County's handling of the case mirrors the structural issues documented in Plaintiff's litigation and in the Wright filings: shifting timelines, multiple versions of the same motion, contradictory scheduling signals, and an administrative posture that generates confusion rather than clarity.
As discovery proceeds, Plaintiff will seek:
- Audit logs and export histories for all ROA outputs, including any internally generated versions produced during the course of Scheffler's litigation;
- Metadata and documentation describing how repeated filings and reissued motions affect the sequencing of events and the perceived procedural posture of a case;
- Internal communications between Bacon and County staff referencing scheduling inconsistencies, deadline conflicts, or the decision to re-file motions instead of correcting existing ones.
Scheffler's case adds an important dimension: even when the ROA itself remains sequential, the County's filing practices and calendar management can create a moving procedural target. When the County reissues motions in multiple versions, adjusts deadlines without clear notice, or shifts its litigation position midstream, the practical effect is similar to an unstable record. Litigants cannot determine which timeline governs, courts are forced to interpret conflicting signals, and appellate rights hinge on administrative guesswork rather than a stable chronological log.
Together with Plaintiff's experience and Wright's federal exhibits, Scheffler's case shows that these failures are not episodic-they are systemic. The issue is not the complexity of any specific dispute, but a County practice that allows procedural timelines to drift without meaningful safeguards. In such an environment, due-process protections, notice obligations, and appellate review cannot reliably function.